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“When  in October 2006  I participated  in a panel  sponsored by  the Yale  Investment Club,  I  shared  the 
dais  with  Frank  Nothaft,  chief  economist  at  Freddie  Mac.    As  I  recall  the  event  now,  I  asked  him  if 
Freddie Mac had stress­tested the impact on itself of a possible housing price decline.  He answered that 
they  had,  and  they  had  even  considered  the  possibility  of  a  13.4%  national  drop  in  home  prices.    I 
protested: “what about the possibility of a drop that is bigger than that?”  He answered that such a drop 


























































































































































homeowners  that  are  underwater3.    In  a  2009  study, Weaver  and  Shen  estimated that  26%  of  homeowners  with  mortgages  were  underwater —  at  the  time,  they estimated  the  market  would  bottom  out  in  the  first  quarter  of  2011,  with  the number growing to 48% expected to have negative equity at the predicted market bottom. 
Figure 2 – Case Shiller Home Price Index Time Series 2000­2012 





































































































1.2% from September to October 2011, while declining 3.4% from October 2010 to 2011.  Prices have currently dropped back to 2003 levels (see figure 2), although the rate of decline has decreased in 14 of 20 markets  from October 2010 to 20114. As prices continue to decline, the amount of borrowers with negative equity increases. Corelogic (2011) estimates that as of the 3rd quarter 2011, 10.7 million or 22.1% of residential  properties  with  mortgages  were  underwater.    This  number  varies greatly  by  state—Nevada  is  the  highest with  58% of  borrowers  underwater, New York is the lowest at 6.3%, while California is at 29.7% (see figure 3). 
Figure 3 – Negative Equity Percentage by State 3Q 2011 ­ Corelogic 


























































































































































































































































































































































borrowers  decisions  to  default.    An  example  of  this  would  be  Smith  and  Smith’s assertion  that  in  the  residential  real  estate market,  “homebuyers  generally do not calculate  present  values”  (2006).    Studies  incorporating  data  from  the  past  few years,  however,  show  that  negative  equity  does  play  a  significant  role  in  a homeowner’s decision to default on their mortgage.  Butta, Dokko and Shan (2010) focus  on  borrowers with mortgages  originating  in  2006  in  Florida,  California  and Nevada and estimate that 20% of defaults are strategic.   Homeowners  generally  walk  away  from  their  homes  due  to  present valuations  and  affordability  issues,  however  negative  equity  also  impacts  the homeowner’s efforts to refinance, thereby effecting affordability if the mortgage has adjustable  rates.    Mortgage  rates  have  lowered  significantly  during  the  housing crash  and  if  homeowners  were  able  to  refinance  their  mortgage  it  would  create more affordable monthly payments.  Negative equity prevents most borrowers from refinancing  as  “they  do  not  have  the  means  or  willingness  to  bring  potentially substantial personal  funds to the transaction,” unless they are able to qualify  for a government loan modification program5 (Fed 2012).  Borrowers  with  adjustable  rate  mortgages  have  greatly  impacted  the mortgage  landscape.    Borrowers with  adjustable  rates  are  unable  to  reduce  their payments  and  incur  increasing  payments  as  their  initial  rates  expire.    Figure  4 shows  a  time  series  of  adjustable  rate mortgage  resets  from  2007  through  2015.  The number of resets does not begin to reduce significantly until the middle of 2012, including the last remaining option adjustable rate reset.  These types of loans allow                                                         5 see http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lower‐payments/Pages/hamp.aspx for information on the HAMP and HARP modification programs 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the  borrower  to  ability  to  choose  their  payment,  including  the  ability  to  pay  less than  the  interest‐only  payment,  thereby  adding  to  their  mortgage  balance  every month until the cap is reached.  These borrowers face the largest monthly payment increase  at  the  reset  due  to  the  change  in  structure  that  requires  them  to  begin paying down interest in addition to an increase in rate from the initial “teaser” rate.   
Figure 4 – Adjustable Rate Mortgage Resets6 
 For  the  purpose  of  this  study,  Strategic  Default  is  defined  as  when  a homeowner defaults  on his mortgage when he  is  able  to  continue making  regular payments.  The  strategic  reason  to  default would  be  to  eliminate  the  under‐water (negative  equity)  condition  of  any owned property.    This  decision would  serve  to accomplish  two  main  objectives—increasing  an  owner’s  net  worth  by  selling  an asset that is worth less than is owed, and increasing monthly cash flow.  For owner 
                                                        6 see  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2007/02/pdf/chap1.pdf 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occupied  residences,  increasing  monthly  cash  flow  is  achieved  by  purchasing  or renting new housing for less than the current monthly mortgage payment.    
Figure 5 – Borrower Default Flow Chart 




















readily available  to capture the outcomes;  therefore the  focus of  this study will be on short sales and REO as the two possible outcomes for a distressed sale. Southern California  is an  ideal  location to study due to  the volume of sales, diversity of  control  variables,  but most  importantly  the  large  rise  and  subsequent decline in the home prices from 2000 to 2010.  California was one of the top states in appreciation rate during the rise of  the housing market; not surprisingly,  it was also one of the top states for depreciation once the housing market bubble burst.  It now boasts one of the highest rates of foreclosure in the country, making it an ideal candidate  for  empirical  study.    Areas  of  the  country  that  did  not  experience  such variance  in  the  housing  market  do  not  make  for  interesting  studies  of  strategic default.    A  necessary  condition  for  strategic  default  is  negative  equity;  studies looking  at  strategic  default  in  previous  downturns  did  not  observe  a  high occurrence  due  to  the minimal  decline  in market  prices.    Studying  data  from  this downturn in markets that experienced less than a 20% decline would yield similar results to previous studies9.   The dataset used for this study is a complete record of all sales in Los Angeles County from 2006‐2010.   Sales data was taken directly from SoCal Multiple Listing Service  (MLS)  at  the  address  level,  and  includes  a  detailed  record  about  the property, including the actual date and condition of sale.  For this study, each sale is coded  into one of  three  categories – 1) organic  sale 2) Short Sale or 3) REO.   The timing  of  the  dataset  will  allow  for  a  unique  perspective  on  the  emergence  of consumer behavior.  In 2006, less than 1% of sales were distressed sales; 2006 will                                                         9 see Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008) and their review of Massachusetts during the 1990’s.   
  9 
not  be  incorporated  extensively  in  this  study,  but  rather  used  to  determine  a baseline.  Figure 6 shows a time series by sale type for 2007‐2010.  The emergence of distressed sales occurred during 2008; in December 2007, they represented less than 10%, by December 2008 they had grown to over 50%.  While the percentage of distressed sales has remained relatively constant since 2008, the ratio of short sales to REOs has fluctuated (see Figures 7 and 8). 
Figure 6 – Sale by type in Los Angeles County 
 An  additional  important  variable  to  consider  is  that  California  is  a  non‐recourse  state.  In  California,  lenders  cannot  pursue  borrowers  for  a  deficiency judgment  if  they  default  on  a  purchase  money  loan  on  their  primary  residence.  Ghent  and Kudlyak  (2009)  showed  that  state  law  regarding  deficiency  judgments was  an  important  variable  in  a  homeowner’s  decision  to  default.  This  is  an 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Given  these  conditions,  we  can  hypothesize  that  people  short  selling  their homes are much more likely to strategically default than people who are foreclosed upon.    If  a borrower  is not  subject  to a deficiency  judgment, but opts  to short  sell their house,   his or her motivation would be  to  lower  their  transaction costs. This can  be  considered  a  strategic  option;  if  he  or  she  did  nothing  they  would  be foreclosed upon, by choosing to short sell they are acting in their self‐interest.   If a borrower were able to continue making payments, but realized the expected utility of default  is greater than continuing to make payments, a short sale  is a preferred outcome to foreclosure.  
  12 
The benefits to a borrower associated with both short sales and foreclosures are that they both eliminate negative equity, they can live rent free while not making payments,  and  future  rental  housing  would  be  at  a  lower  monthly  cost.    The additional benefits to a short sale are the certainty of a planned move out date, and the ability  to extend the  trustee sale while  the short sale  is being negotiated.   The costs that are similarly associated with both short sales and foreclosures are moving costs, the loss of any intrinsic value of home ownership, and the tax deductions from homeownership.   The negative aspects of a foreclosure are greater than a short sale in two key ways—a  foreclosure damages credit scores more than a short sale, and foreclosures have  a  greater  social  stigma.    Foreclosures  are  a more  public  process  than  short sales, as the notice of default is visibly posted on the property, thus it is expected to generate  a  greater  social  stigma.  Previous  costs  such  as  potential  deficiency judgments from foreclosures and borrowers needing to bring cash to close or sign promissory notes for short sale have been rendered moot due to recent changes in California law 11, however during the data sample were relevant costs to consider. Depressed  housing  prices  have  a  negative  spillover  effect  on  the  overall economy; as such the government has tried to enact various public policy programs to help stimulate the housing market.   There are two main channels  for which the value of  the housing stock  interacts with  the economy –  the  income effect and the wealth  effect.    The  income  effect  was  present  when  borrowers  were  able  to withdraw  equity  from  their  homes  to  supplement  their  income  levels.    As  the                                                         11 see section 580e ‐ http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi‐bin/displaycode?section=ccp&group=00001‐01000&file=577‐582.5 
  13 
housing  prices  crashed,  this  supplemental  income  and  economic  stimulus evaporated.  The wealth effect is reflected by the change in consumer consumption based on various levels of perceived wealth.  A good proxy to represent the wealth effect  is  the  ratio  of  home  price  to  disposable  personal  income  (see  Figure  9).  Stabilizing home prices would serve to increase the income and wealth effects and would help stimulate economic growth.   
Figure 9­ National Home Price to Disposable Income per Capita12 
   Figure  10  represents  the  various  types  of  default  as  defined  by  Oliver Wyman/Experian (2011).  In their study they define strategic default as a borrower who goes straight from 60 days past due to 180+ past due, while continuing to pay on  their  non‐mortgage  related  debts  such  as  credit  cards  or  auto  loans.    They                                                         12 chart from http://www.housingviews.com/2011/12/29/rent‐buy‐and‐price‐income‐ratios‐look‐positive/  
  14 
suggest  that  if  a  borrower were  truly  distressed,  they would  cease  all  payments; these  borrowers  are  represented  by  the  distressed  defaults  category.    The  most drastic change since 2004 has been the reduction in the amount of borrowers who cure their debts after going 60 days past due.    In 2005, 40% of borrowers became current  again,  this  number  has  steadily  declined  and  as  of  2010  was  only  3%.   Understanding  the  consumer  decision‐making  process  once  default  occurs  is  now crucial, given that almost every default leads to a distressed sale. 
Figure 10 ­  Mortgage Default Segments for 60 Days Past Due Borrowers 

















































might  say mistakes  and debacles)  that  facilitated  the millennial wave  of  consumption.  For many,  the 






  This dissertation begins by studying the choices borrowers facing mortgage default  have  at  their  disposal  if  they  are  not  able  or  choose  not  to  cure  their mortgage deficiency.   When  a  borrower  falls  behind on  their mortgage payments, the lender will issue a notice of default and if the borrower takes no other action, he will eventually face a foreclosure.  Borrowers have another option, they can contact their  lender and opt  instead for a short sale, whereby they will sell  their home for less than is owed to the owner of the mortgage note.  This is a strategic choice that borrowers have the ability to exercise.  This purpose of this chapter is to create an empirical  model  that  will  aid  in  predicting  the  critical  choice  consumers  facing mortgage default have to make. Southern  California  will  be  used  as  the  area  of  analysis  for  this  study;  it makes  for  an  ideal  location  to  study  based  on  the  volume  of  sales,  diversity  of control variables, but most importantly the large rise and subsequent decline in the home prices from 2000 to 2010. It now boasts one of the highest rates of foreclosure 
  17 






Literature Review    Research on  strategic default  is  a  recent development as an area  for  study.  This section will begin with a brief look at the first articles written on default, then focus on the current literature.   Early  literature  on  mortgage  default  positioned  the  option  to  default similarly to a put on a stock option.   The put option—mortgage default—would be exercised when it was in the money13, which in this case meant negative value of the mortgage.    Foster  and  Van  Order  (1984,  85)  studied  whether  homeowners  were “ruthless,” defaulting immediately when there was negative value of the mortgage.  In an economic model without  transaction costs,  it would be expected  that people would  default  ruthlessly,  however  their  findings  did  not  confirm  the  theory.  Instead,  they posited that only 4.2% of mortgages with the  loan to value ratio14  in excess  of  110%  defaulted,  attributing  this  to  “transaction  costs  that,  presumably, drive the model” (1984).   The transaction costs associated with mortgage default have been estimated as an explanation for why non‐ruthless mortgage default occurs.   Cunningham and Hendershot (1984) created a theoretical model to estimate the benefits to default as compared  to  the  costs  associated with  exercising  the put  option.    The  gains  to be expected from default are the recapture of negative equity and the free rent gained between the time of default and foreclosure.  The costs would include the quality of                                                         13 An option is in the money when the price crosses the exercise price. In the case of a put, when the price of the good drops below the exercise price, it is said to be in the money.  If the price continues to drop, it has no impact to the owner of the put, as they can sell the good for the exercise price of the option. 14 Loan to value(LTV) ratio = price of the home/value of the mortgage, in this case a LTV ratio of 110% would mean the home is 10% underwater 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housing  alternatives,  the  recourse  from  the  lender,  and  their  “psychological aversion” to default.  It is assumed that owning is preferred to renting; the authors estimate  that  a  foreclosure would  prevent  an  individual  from obtaining  credit  for another mortgage for up to ten years.  They factor this in as a cost to default in terms of  the  present  value  of  owning  versus  renting  for  an  extended  period.    In  their simple model,  if  the  costs  of  default  exceed  the benefits,  a  homeowner would not exercise the put option on the mortgage.  They estimate that the cost of default for a household to be between 20 and 25 percent of the value of the house.   Kau,  Keenan  and Kim  (1993,  94)  look  at  loan  to  value  at  origination  as  an important variable in understanding the exercising of the mortgage put option. They constructed a theoretical model to forecast the differing probabilities for default by changing the initial conditions and inserting shocks. House price variance was used as  one  of  the  experimental  variables;  15% was  chosen  as  the maximum variance.  They found that LTV at origination to be a significant variable, for price decreases of 15%, they found that loans with 80% LTV at origination would default 2.85% of the time; while mortgages with 95% LTV at origination would default 19.06% over the 30 year duration of the mortgage.  Other factors they considered were interest rates and transaction costs. They note, however, that it isn’t the lack of transaction costs that lowers the probability of default, but similar to stock options, when the option is  in the money,  it does not always get exercised.   The homeowner always has the ability to default in the future if prices continue to decrease.   The aforementioned studies were all successful in identifying the important variables in the homeowner’s decision‐making process to default on their mortgage. 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None  of  these  studies  however,  were  able  to  utilize  actual  data  in  drawing  their conclusions  of  how  homeowners  would  react  in  extreme  drops  in  the  housing market.   For example, Kau, Keenan and Kim (1993,94) used 15% as the maximum price  reduction  in  their  model,  in  the  recent  housing  crash,  some  markets experienced  more  than  a  50%  drop.    Recent  studies  have  had  the  benefit  of analyzing  this  recent  crash  to  see  whether  people  default  ruthlessly,  or  if  other factors such as transaction costs affect their decision to walk away from their home.  The current  literature has formed two hypotheses—the double trigger default and the strategic default.     The double‐trigger hypothesis is that negative equity is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for default.  Proponents of this view argue that an income shock is needed in addition to negative equity in order for a default to occur—they do not believe  in  ruthless  default.    The  main  study  cited  that  supports  this  view  is  the Boston  Fed  report  authored  by  Foote,  Gerardi,  and Willen  (2008).    They  studied homeowners  in  Massachusetts  who  had  negative  equity  in  the  early  1990s  and found  that  less  than  10%  of  these  homeowners  eventually  lost  their  home  to foreclosure.    Based  upon  their  findings,  they  conclude,  “borrowers  with  negative equity and a stable stream of income will, in most cases, prefer to continue making mortgage  payments.”    In  addition  to  finding  strategic  default  to  be  a  minor occurrence,  they  also  argued  that  the  government  should  not  sponsor  any homeowner retention policies such as loan modifications.   Based on the notion that income shocks are the necessary condition for default, any polices designed to lower 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payments would find that “the costs of forgone income from borrowers who would have made payments often exceeds the benefits of fewer foreclosures.” Subsequent  studies  have  found  a  preponderance  of  evidence  pointing  to strategic default as a much more  likely explanation describing homeowners use of the put  option.   Within  the  extant  literature,  studies have  focused on  recourse  vs. non‐recourse  states,  borrower  credit  scores,  the  types  of  mortgages  initially obtained,  and  home  equity  loans  as  explanatory  variables  to  help  understand borrowers motives for strategically defaulting.   The  latter  of  these  examples,  home  equity  extraction,  is  an  example  of  a borrower  worsening  their  initial  condition  by  taking  on  additional  debt.    Home equity  loans were often referred  to as a home ATMs, as home prices continued  to increase, the cash availability on home equity loans continued to increase.  Once the market  peaked  and  subsequently  crashed,  the  homes,  and  specifically  additional home  equity  loans,  “morphed  from  piggy  bank  to  albatross”  (Weaver  and  Shen 2009).  Mian and Sufi (2010) estimated that homeowners borrowed 25% of all the home equity gains from 2002 to 2006.  Their findings were that 1.25 trillion dollars in  household  debt  from  2002  to  2006  was  attributable  to  increased  borrowing against  the value of  the home.    In  their  study of defaults between 2006 and 2008 they  found  that  39%  of  borrowers  who  defaulted  had  borrowed  “aggressively against the rising value of their houses.” Homeowners  taking  out  additional  home  equity mortgages  in  combination with  declining  market  prices  resulted  in  an  unprecedented  level  of  underwater borrowers.  Another major contributing factor to the rise in negative equity was the 
  22 
types of loans used to purchase homes.  Exotic loans where people could put as little as 0% down became commonplace; with 100% financed properties, any decline in the  market  immediately  causes  negative  equity.    Prior  to  the  loosening  of  down payment  and  underwriting  standards,  homeowners  that  put  20%  down  could withstand most market  corrections without  going  underwater.    Butta,  Dokko  and Shan (2010) studied what they believed to be the most likely group of homeowners to  default  to  determine,  at  the  extreme,  how  prevalent  strategic  default  could  be.  Their  study only  focuses on homeowners who purchased homes  in 2006 with 0% down  payments  in  Arizona,  California,  Florida,  and  Nevada.    These  homeowners purchased right before the crash; as a result they would not have experienced much appreciation, but could have seen depreciation by more than 50% in the following two  or  three  years.    Their  findings  were  that  the  median  borrower  does  not strategically  default  until  equity  falls  to  62%  of  their  homes  value  (38% underwater). However, once negative equity reaches at  least 50%, then half of  the defaults  are  driven  by  negative  equity.    Of  all  the  homeowners  in  the  study,  they found that only 20% of all defaults were strategic.   Looking at cross sectional data across states can omit important differences in state laws that would effect the decision to strategically default.  One such crucial difference is the ability of lenders to pursue borrowers for a deficiency judgment in the case of default.  In recourse states, lenders can sue the borrower for damages for any amount the lender isn’t able to recover from the sale of the property including any  legal  costs  associated  with  a  foreclosure.    Some  states,  however,  are  non‐recourse states;  in such states,  if a borrower defaults on a  loan,  the  lender cannot 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pursue the borrowers for any losses.   Therefore, borrowers in non‐recourse states are  more  likely  to  exercise  the  default  option,  as  the  transaction  costs  are  much lower than when a lender can pursue a deficiency judgment.   Ghent  and  Kudlyak  (2009)  look  at  mortgage  default  and  separate  states according  to  their  recourse  laws.   They  find  that  the probability of default  is 20% higher  in  states  with  no  recourse;  however,  they  find  that  this  difference  is  only present  for  borrowers with  significant  assets.    For  borrowers with  no  assets,  the threat of a deficiency judgment carries no additional deterrence; they have no assets to protect from lender lawsuits.  The authors used purchase price of the home as a proxy for wealth, finding a positive correlation between purchase price and default.  For houses worth less than $200,000, there was no difference based on recourse.  As prices  increased  to  the $300,000  to $500,000 range,  they  found  that borrowers  in non‐recourse states were 59% more likely to default. Another variable to consider is the credit score of the borrower; when taking transaction  costs  into  account,  high  credit  score  borrowers  would  face  higher transaction costs than those with low credit scores.  It takes years to rebuild credit scores; therefore borrowers with higher credit scores should in theory face higher transaction costs due to the value they place on having good credit.  Oliver Wyman (2009) partnered with Experian to conduct a study focusing on identifying patterns for strategic defaulters.  This research design included the pairing of mortgage data along with  credit  report  information  for  borrowers;  this  unique  data  allowed  the researchers to incorporate consumer decision‐making into their model. 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The  Wyman‐Experian  study  defines  strategic  default  occurring  when  a  borrower  is only  in default on  their mortgage, but not any of  their credit cards or other monthly debt payments.  In addition, borrowers must go straight from current to 60+ days delinquent, that is to say borrowers who fall 30 days behind and then cure the debt would be excluded in the future when they fall 60 days late.  Using this definition, they found that 18% of mortgages in default in the fourth quarter of 2008 could  be  defined  as  strategic.    In  California  from  2005  to  2008,  there  was  an estimated 6800% increase in the number of strategic defaults.  The study also found that borrowers with higher origination balances and high credit scores were more likely to be strategic defaulters.   Looking at borrowers with Vantage Scores higher than  900,  they  accounted  for  30%  of  all  mortgages,  but  only  3%  of  all  defaults.  However,  within  the  small  number  of  defaults,  27%  were  found  to  be  strategic, compared  to  15% of  the  overall  population.    This  indicates  that  high  credit  score borrowers were twice as likely to strategically default than the mean population.   The first survey conducted regarding individual’s thoughts on strategic default was  published  by  Guiso,  Sapienza,  and  Zingales  (2009).    Using  data  from  the Financial  Trust  Index  (FTI)15,  they  studied  the  impact  of  certain  demographic variables  on  a  borrower’s  propensity  to  strategically  default  given  a  hypothetical underwater condition. The authors used age as a proxy for relocation costs, since it is  assumed  that  older people have higher  relocation  costs,  partially due  to having children,  therefore more of an attachment  to  the community.   Their  findings were that  people  over  65  were  more  likely  to  default  strategically.    When  looking  at                                                         15 www.financialtrustindex.com  ‐ compiled by the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University 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income  levels,  they  found a negative  correlation  to  strategic default,  however,  the findings were not statistically significant in their models.  The inclusion of ethnicity variables  did  not  prove  to  be  generally  statistically  significant  in  most  models, however,  Hispanics  were  positively  correlated  when  looking  at  the  possibility  of being $100k underwater.   Employment levels were statistically significant, but had no real impact on default with a coefficient of  .001.   When surveyed, people with a college  education, were  less  likely  to  say  that  strategically  defaulting was morally wrong.  Finally, ceteris paribus, people who have been in their home for more than 5 years were 78% less likely to default. Fannie Mae  conducts  a  National  Housing  Survey  quarterly,  the  3rd  quarter 2011  survey  focused  on  demographic  characteristics  of  underwater  homeowners compared  to  all  homeowners  with  a  mortgage  (Fannie  Mae  2011).    Fewer underwater  homeowners  graduated  college  than  the  mean  sample  of  all  owners with a mortgage; 40% compared to 48% of all mortgagees.  The age profile for both groups was almost the same, with 11% of homeowners and underwater borrowers being over 65 years old. For underwater homeowners, 28% are between 50 and 64, while  the  number  for  all  owners  with  a  mortgage  drops  to  25%.    Underwater homeowners were also more likely to be from minority groups; 14% were Black and 12% Hispanic, compared to 9% Black and 10% Hispanic for all homeowners with a mortgage.  Income levels for underwater borrowers were slightly lower than those of  all  borrowers;  35%  were  between  $50k  and  $99k,  compared  to  39%  for  all borrowers.    Finally,  underwater  borrowers  reported  having  fewer  assets;  71% reported having less than $100k in assets, compared to 64% of all borrowers. 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A  different  research  design  to  model  strategic  behavior  is  to  create  a consumer decision model where each mortgage outcome is either current on their payment  or  results  in  a  distressed  sale.    An  example  of  this  methodology  was employed by Bajari, Chu, and Ming (2008) in their study of subprime loans between 2000 and 2007.  The authors obtained national individual level mortgage data from Loan Performance  (LP)  for  a  sample  of  sub prime mortgages.   Monthly  payments were coded as either current or as a default ending in foreclosure.   LP made some individual  borrower  characteristics  available  such  as  the  term  of  the  loan,  initial interest  rate,  level  of  documentation,  appraised  value  and  FICO  score.    The  initial value of the home was merged with the S&P Case Shiller Home price index for each of 20 major markets, then adjusted monthly to track the changes in market pricing.  Additionally,  Census  data  was  merged  at  the  zip‐code  level  for  demographic variables  such  as  per‐capita  income,  education,  age  and  ethnicity  and  included  as explanatory variables in the study. Using  a  bivariate  probit  to model  the  loan  outcome  for  the  sample  of  sub‐prime borrowers, Bajari, Chu, and Ming  (2008)  found  that a 20% decline  in home prices  would  make  the  borrower  15.38%  more  likely  to  default  than  a  similar borrower  who  did  not  experience  any  price  reduction.    Their  findings  were  that income  and  employment  levels  were  both  significant;  a  one  standard  deviation increase  (12%)  in  the  ratio  of  income  to  mortgage  payment  leads  to  a  17.15% increase in the probability of default.  Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the  unemployment  rate  (1.42%)  led  to  a  10.09%  increase  in  the  probability  of default. 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Theory and Methodology   The choice borrowers face when they have defaulted on their mortgage can be classified as a discrete categorical unordered choice. The dependant variable  is represented  by  the  3  categories  of  real  estate  sales  (1)  Organic  Sale  –  A  non‐distressed sale (2) Short Sale – sale requiring lender approval where the sale price is below what is owed on the mortgage (3) REO – Sale by lender after the property has been  foreclosed.    In  order  to model  the  choice  an  individual  faces,  a Multinomial Probit model  (MNP) will be employed.    Individuals  in  the MNP are assumed  to be utility  maximizers  who  will  choose  the  option  that  maximizes  their  utility—the summation of the probability for the three possible outcomes must always be equal to  one.    The  base  case  for  the MNP will  be  REO,  once  borrowers  default  on  their mortgage, they must decide to take action in order to avoid foreclosure. This would be the natural outcome if no action were taken,  and functions as the base case. The base case allows us to model the decision choice between foreclosure and short sale for that borrowers who have defaulted on their mortgage face.   The MNP does not have the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), therefore any possible  omitted  choices  would  not  change  an  individual’s  evaluation  of  one alternative relative to another.   The sales level data was taken from SoCal MLS, it was exported for all closed sales in Los Angeles county from Jan 1, 2006 through Dec. 31 2010.  Each individual sale was  coded  as  either  an  organic,  short  sale,  or  REO  based  on  the  information contained  in  the  “sold  terms”  or  “special  conditions”  categories.    In  order  to determine  the  annual  change  in  price  for  each  census  tract,  the  mean  price  per 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square foot (psqft) of all closed sales was calculated.  Using 2006 as the baseline for price per  square  foot,  a price  change was  calculated  for  each year between 2007‐2010.  For any given year x:         Pricechange (x)= ((psqft(x) – psqft2006) / psqft2006)) 
Table 1 – Summary Statistics by Sale Type and Price Drop 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Short Sale - 2007 1972 0.0224 0.0501 0 1 
Short Sale - 2008 1969 0.0822 0.099 0 1 
Short Sale - 2009 1985 0.1245 0.1003 0 1 
Short Sale - 2010 2044 0.1956 0.1134 0 1 
Short Sale - All 2047 0.1429 0.0769 0 0.75 
            
REO - 2007 1972 0.0322 0.0686 0 1 
REO - 2008 1969 0.2754 0.2264 0 1 
REO - 2009 1985 0.3542 0.237 0 1 
REO - 2010 2044 0.247 0.1461 0 1 
REO - All 2047 0.2882 0.1618 0 1 
            
Price Change - 2007 1957 -0.0317 0.135 -0.6163 2.81 
Price Change - 2008 1947 -0.262 0.152 -0.7957 0.4769 
Price Change - 2009 1962 -0.3793 0.1678 -0.8284 0.5352 
Price Change - 2010 1985 -0.3367 0.1978 -0.8822 1.39  The  price  change  for  each  individual  sale  is  represented  by  the  aggregate price drop of all sales within the given census tract18.  Table 1 contains the summary statistics for the sale type and price drop statistics19.   The percentage of short sales in Los Angeles County  increased  in every year  from 2007 through 2010, while the mean  percent  (14.29%)  was  higher  than  in  any  year  but  2010  (19.56%).    The 
                                                        18 Using mean price per square foot prices for a given census tract is a good proxy for understanding local market conditions.  Other measures such as mean sales price do not account for quality or size of homes, therefore do not accurately reflect changes in market prices, but rather are skewed to reflect the types of homes sold in a given period.   Similarly, measures using the repeat sales methodology are only available at the city and MSA level, therefore do not accurately reflect local market changes. 19 Organic sales summary statistics were not included as they are not the area of focus for this study, the percent of organic sales can be calculated by taking 1 minus the total percent of short sales and REOs. 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percentage  of  REO  sales  increased  from  2007  to  2009,  then  decreased  in  2010. Prices  dropped  from  2007‐2009,  with  the  majority  of  the  drop  (23.1%)  coming between 2007 and 2008; prices then increased slightly in 2010 (4.2%). Demographic  variables  were  exported  from  Census  Bureau  data  and  from supplemental census data contained on Simply Map20.  Every sale was geo coded in ArcGIS using  the 2010 census  shapefiles,21  then placed within  the  relevant  census tract; socio‐demographic variables were then aggregated to the census tract level on an annual basis.  The descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in the MNP models can be found in Table 2.  The data is for the years 2007 through 2010, the 2054 census tracts in Los Angeles County have unique data for every year of the sample. 
Table 2 – Summary Statistics for Socio­Demographic Variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Employment 234029 91.64 6.04 14 100 
Income (Per Capita) 234026 32296 22440 1810 230620 
Income Shock 233973 30204 21812 843 230620 
            
Sales Price 234559 553171 629866 14500 36700000 
Education 234559 19.59 11.07 0 100 
Credit Card Debt 234026 0.3087 0.2277 0.009 3.56 
Net Worth 234486 599163 290424 83506 1973890 
Stability 234559 37.47 11.48 0 65 
Owner Occupancy 234559 59.51 24.31 0 100 
Age 234098 34.85 6.85 17 70 
Asian 234559 13.89 14.03 0 84 
Hispanic 234559 40.4 29.48 0 98 
Black 234559 8.4 14.31 0 91   Proponents  of  the  “double  trigger”  hypothesis  (Foster  and  Van  Order 1984)(Foote, Gerardi, and Willen 2008) argue that an  income shock  is required  in                                                         20 Simplymap.com 21 http://www2.census.gov/cgi‐bin/shapefiles2009/state‐files?state=06 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order  for  borrowers  to  choose  to  strategically  default  on  their  mortgage.    The alternative  hypothesis—strategic  default—proposes  that  negative  equity  is  a sufficient condition for strategic default and that an income shock is not necessary (Cunningham  and  Hendershot  1984)(Butta,  Dokko  and  Shan  2010)(Ghent  and Kudlyak 2009)(Oliver Wyman 2009)(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2009).  The  first  component  of  an  income  shock  is  employment  levels;  the  ideal measure would  be  to  have  individual  data  on whether  the  borrower  is  currently employed.  For this study, a proxy of the average employment rate within the census tract was used.   Most  studies utilize unemployment  levels,  however, based on  the persistent  high  rates  of  unemployment,  the  number  of  discouraged  workers  has increased.    Individuals  no  longer  looking  for  work  are  not  included  in  the unemployment numbers, therefore using the employment rate will capture the total percent  of  people  working  rather  than  those  simply  looking  for  work.  The preponderance of the findings using data from the most recent market crash suggest that income shocks are not a necessary condition for default; it is therefore expected that employment will have an insignificant impact on default. In  addition  to  employment  levels,  income  levels  are  also  incorporated  to further  analyze  the  impact  of  income  shocks  on  default.    The  ideal  measure  of income would  be  to  have  the  income  level  for  each  homeowner  in  the  sample.  A proxy for income was used, measured by the mean household income per capita for each  census  tract. Guiso,  Sapienza,  and Zingales  (2009)  found  income  levels  to be negatively  correlated with  strategic  default,  but  it was  statistically  insignificant  in their model.    The National Housing  Survey  (Fannie Mae 2011)  found  that  income 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levels  were  lower  for  underwater  homeowners  than  the  general  sample  of  all borrowers.    Bajari,  Chu  and  Park  (2008)  studied  a  sample  of  subprime mortgage from 2000 through 2007 and found that default is more prevalent in areas of lower income.  They found that taking the first difference of one standard deviation (12%) in the ratio of mortgage payments to monthly income yielded a 17.15% increased in the  predicted  probability  of  default.    Based  on  the  findings  in  the  literature,  it  is expected  that  income will  have  a  negative  impact  on  default,  such  that  a  raise  in income levels will lower the probability of all distressed sales. A  change  in  the  price  level  of  the  home  is  represented  by  a  proxy  of  the change  in  the  mean  price  per  square  foot  of  all  sales  since  2006.  The  data  is aggregated  annually,  so,  for  any  given  sale,  the  mean  price  from  that  year  is compared  to  the  2006  baseline.    The  ideal  measure  would  be  to  have  the  actual amount of equity for each homeowner at the time of sale for the entire sample.  All of the literature on mortgage default finds that a reduction in price is strongly tied to  an  increase  in  defaults.    Bajari,  Chu,  and  Park  (2008)  found  in  their  study  of borrowers with no down payment, that a 20% decline in home prices would lead to a  15.38%  increase  in  the  likelihood  of  default.    In  a  similar  study  of  borrowers financing 100% of the purchase price, Butta, Dokko and Shan (2010) found that the median  borrower  does  not  strategically  default  until  they  are  38%  underwater. Based on the findings in the literature it is expected that a reduction in home prices will have a strong positive relationship to default. Taking  the  measures  of  income  and  employment  individually  does  not represent an income shock, but rather it is the combination of the two that creates 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the shock.    Income shocks can be the result of either a reduction of  income, or the loss of employment, therefore a variable was constructed to represent the net effect of employment and  income.    Income Shock  is  represented by  the mean household income  per  capita  divided  by  the  employment  level  in  a  census  tract.    The  newly created variable will allow for the direct testing of the double trigger hypothesis; the construction of an interactive variable between price change and income shocks will demonstrate  whether  both  price  changes  and  income  shocks  are  necessary  for distressed sales to emerge. Several models will be constructed based upon the theories presented in the relevant  literature.   The  first model—the baseline model—was created  from the 3 variables  listed  above  on  their  own:  employment,  income  levels,  and  price reduction.   A  second model—the  income shock model—was  created  comprised of the  income  shock  and  price  change  variables  along  with  the  interactive  variable between  the  two.   The purpose of  this model  is  to directly  test  the double  trigger hypothesis that states an income shock is a necessary condition for strategic default.  This model will allow for the comparison of the effects that income shocks and price change  have  in  combination  on  the  borrowers  decision  to  short  sale  or  take  no action and be foreclosed upon by the lender.   A  third  fully  specified model  includes  various  socio‐demographic  variables that are identified in the literature in addition to the baseline model.   The first of the independent variables that will be added to the baseline model is education; it is a measure of the percent of college graduates within the given census tract.  This is a proxy  trying  to capture  the homeowners awareness of  the cost benefit analysis of 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short sale compared to foreclosure.  An ideal measure would be to have survey data from homeowners  selling  their homes  in  the  sample  that  captured  the knowledge regarding the cost or benefits regarding distressed sales outcomes. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009)  found that people with a college education were  less  likely  to say that strategically defaulting was morally wrong.   Similar results were found by Bajari, Chu, and Park (2008), who found that default is more prevalent in areas with less  education  (as  measured  by  the  percent  of  college  graduates).    Anecdotal evidence of education  impacting decision‐making can be observed by  the  fact  that the  Mortgage  Bankers  Association  (MBA)  defaulted  and  short  sold  their headquarters.  It is assumed that the MBA would be highly informed on the cost and benefits  associated  with  default,  they  decided  to  short  sell  rather  than  foreclose based on their knowledge. Based on the literature, it is expected that education will have  a  negative  relationship  to  default.    Further,  based  on  the  net  gains  to borrowers  associated with  short  sales  compared  to  foreclosures,  it  can be  argued that more  informed  borrowers will  be  equipped  to  calculate which  outcome  is  in their best interest. The  second  variable  added  to  the  fully  specified  model  is  a  measure  to capture  the  impact  of  credit  card  debt,  in  this  case  as  a  percent  of  income.    The income percentage  is used  in order to normalize  the  impact of  the debt at various levels of  income.   An  ideal measure would be  to have  the debt‐to‐income ratio  for credit card debt for each homeowner in the sample.  For the study, a proxy was used comprised of the mean credit debt as a percentage of household income per capita for  each  census  tract.  Including  the  consumer  debt  variable  will  aid  in  further 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examining the impact that income has on borrowers default decision‐making.  In the Wyman‐Experian  (2011)  study  on  strategic  default,  they  identified  strategic defaulters as borrowers who continued paying their credit cards while defaulting on their mortgages.   It can also be surmised, that consumers use credit cards to make up  for  income  shortfalls,  such  that  increased  levels  of  credit  card  debt  can  be interpreted  as  a  measure  of  insufficient  income  to  cover  monthly  expenses.  It  is therefore expected that credit card debt will be positively related to default, but that it should have less of an impact on short sales, which is more likely to be a strategic behavior.  Conversely, the accumulation of assets indicates an income surplus, therefore the inclusion of a net worth variable can be used as a proxy measuring consumers that  have  sufficient  income  to  cover  their  monthly  expenses.  The  ideal  measure would  be  to  have  the  income  surplus  for  each  individual  borrower  in  order  to capture  the  homeowner’s  ability  to  cover  their  mortgage.    Ghent  and  Kudlyak (2009)  studied  the  impact  that  deficiency  judgments  had  on  strategic  default,  in doing  so  they  used  home  price  as  a  proxy  for  wealth.    Their  finding was  that  as prices increased in non‐recourse states, borrowers were more likely to default.  Net worth is a measure of an individuals wealth, therefore it is expected that it will have a positive relationship to default. The next  independent variable represents the makeup of residents within a census tract; owner occupancy is a measure of the percentage of residents who are occupying their primary residence.  Rather than the proxy for the census tract level data,  the  ideal  measure  would  be  the  occupancy  status  for  each  individual 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homeowner, that is to say is the property a rental or owner occupied.  Measuring the profile of the census tract, however, does provide additional insight into the makeup the  neighborhood  quality  that  is  not  captured  by  the  individual  property  data.  It therefore serves as a valid measure for capturing neighborhood quality in addition to acting as a proxy for individual level analysis.  The  literature  has  mixed  findings  on  the  impact  of  owner  occupancy  on default.   Bajari, Chu, and Park  (2008)  found  that 8.28% of  loans held by  investors ended  in  default,  the  percentage  increased  to  11.02%  for  owner  occupants.  Conversely,  Cowan and Cowan  (2004)  in  their  study of  subprime mortgages  from 1995‐2001 found that properties owned by investors were three times more likely to  default  ending  in  foreclosure  than  owner  occupied  homes.      In  the  Wyman‐Experian (2011) on strategic default, they found that owner occupants (owners with 1 mortgage) were the least likely to strategically default, but the most likely to have a  distressed  default.    As  the  number  of  properties with mortgages  increased,  the number  of  distressed  defaults  decreased,  while  the  number  of  strategic  defaults increased22.    Based  on  the  literature,  it  is  unclear  what  directional  relationship owner occupancy will have on default. A  related  variable  to  owner  occupancy  is  the  duration  that  a  resident  has lived at  the same address.  In order to capture stability within a neighborhood, the percentage of occupants residing at the same address for 5 or more years (stability) was added to the model. This measure is a good proxy for neighborhood quality, but                                                         22 The study broke down 1 through 5 properties, and then had a category for 5+ properties.  Strategic default was estimated at 14% for borrowers with 1 mortgage and 40% for 5+ mortgages.  Distressed default was estimated at 35% for borrowers with 1 mortgage and decreased to 20% for 5+ mortgages. 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also an additional measure to capture individual’s social ties based on the duration of  residence  in  a  community.    Guiso,  Sapienza,  and  Zingales  (2009)  found  that people who have been in their home for more than 5 years were 78% less likely to default.    It  can  be  argued  that  that  longer  individuals  reside  in  a  community,  the more  they  will  develop  social  ties,  and  will  therefore  be  less  likely  to  ruthlessly default.  In addition to social ties, longer duration would imply that they purchased during the rapid price appreciation period before the housing bubble burst23.  Given that  likelihood  of  increased  equity  and  stronger  social  ties,  it  is  expected  that stability will be negatively related to default. The last control variable included is the sales price for the actual home in the data sample.  This measure was included to determine if price level of the individual property has an impact on the borrowers decision‐making.  This is not being used as a proxy to capture other measures of quality, but rather as an exogenous measure.  Sales  price  has  been  used  in  other  studies  to  capture wealth  (Ghent  and Kudlyak 2009),  in this case it  is being used to capture any institutional  incentives that may exist to influence borrower decision‐making.   A  third agent,  in addition to  the borrower and the  lender,  that  is party  to a short  sale  transaction  is  the  real  estate agent.    Short  sales  require additional  time and work to be completed by the real estate agent compared to an organic  or REO sale. As such, real estate agents are incentivized to focus on higher priced properties so  that  they  can  be  adequately  compensated  for  their  efforts.    Ceteris  Paribas,  an agent will  receive  a  larger  commission  on  a  higher  priced  home  than  for  a  lower                                                         23 Note that this is an observation based on the timing of the sample used for this study and not necessarily an observation that is generalizable to other studies 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priced home.  Given the additional work performed by the real estate agent, it can be argued that they may avoid marketing towards low priced properties.  The expected relationship  is  that  sales  price  will  be  negatively  related  to  distressed  sales, specifically favoring short sales at higher price points. Finally,  sets  of  demographic  control  variables were  included  in  the model.  Median  age,  percentage  of  Asian  residents,  percentage  of  Hispanic  residents,  and percentage of Black residents were all  included  in  the  fully specified model.    Ideal measures would be  to have  individual homeowner  level data,  rather  than a proxy for the census tract level data. 
Findings and Analysis   Table 3 contains the results of the 3 multinomial probit models (MNP) where sales  type  is  the dependent variable;  the models  include all  closed  sales,  coded as either {1} organic {2} Short Sale or {3} REO (base outcome), in Los Angeles County from  January 1, 2007  through December 31, 2010.   The  relationship of  interest  is the  borrower’s  decision  between  foreclosure  and  short  sale—represented  by models 2, 4 and 6 in the results table. The direction sign of the coefficient indicates the directional relationship the variable has relative to the base outcome (REO), the value of the coefficients will be converted to a predicted probabilities for short sales and  REO  so  that  the  directional  relationship  of  the  independent  variable  can  be determined (see table 4 and figure 12).  The statistical significance of coefficient the represents  whether  the  variable  impacts  the  borrowers  decision  between  the outcome and the base case; the statistical significance of the predicted probabilities are calculated separately. 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Table 3 – Baseline Multinomial Probit  Model Results  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Baseline Baseline Income Shock Income Shock Full Full 
 Organic Short Sale Organic Short Sale Organic Short Sale 
Price Change 4.8* 1.31* 4.11* 1.63* 1.56* .756* 
 (.03) (.036) (.045) (.054) (.057) (.068) 
       
Employment -0.0085* -0.01653*     
 (.00088) (.001)     
       
Income  0.0000119* 0.0000079*     
 (.00000027) (.00000032)     
Income Shock   .0000175* -.00000069 .0000024*** .0000084* 
   (.00000052) (.00000067) (.00000089) (.0000011) 
       
Interactive (P & I)   .0000254* -0000241* 0.0000248* -.0000234* 
   (.00000165) (.000002) (.0000018) (.0000022) 
       
Sales Price     .0000024* .00000081* 
     (.00000002) (.00000003) 
       
Education     .0027** .0059* 
     (.0011) (.0013) 
       
Credit Card Debt     -2.228* -.4511* 
     (.0416) (.0506) 
       
Net Worth     -.0000066* -.00000042* 
     (.00000005) (.00000007) 
       
Stability     .0126* .0026* 
     (.00074) (.00086) 
       
Owner Occupancy     -.00594* -0.00007 
     (.00045) (.00052) 
       
Age     -.0055* -.0042** 
     (.0016) (.0018) 
       
Asian     .0011* -.00165* 
     (.000441) (.00053) 
       
Hispanic     .00097** -.00367* 
     (.0004) (.00045) 
       
Black     -0.00079** -.008* 
     (.00036) (.00045) 
       
Constant 2.71* 1.25* 1.78* -.0738* 1.56* .1624* 
 (.082) (.094) (.017) (.022) (.063) (.076) 
N 232952 232952 232952 232952 232952 232952 
Log Likelihood -170777 -170777 -170444 -170444 -161778 -161778 
Wald chi^2 45957 45957 45184 45184 51613 51613 
Prob > chi ^2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Standard errors in parentheses           
*** p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *p<0.01     
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The baseline model measures  the  impact  of  employment,  income  level  and price  change  on  sales  outcome;  the  results  confirmed  the  theory  in  the  literature that a reduction in price level has a positive impact on the probability of short sale and REO.  Income level also had the predicted negative relationship to both types of distressed sales.  Of note, was that employment had a negative relationship to short sales, but a positive relationship  to REO sales (determined based on the predicted probability,  not  the  coefficients  in MNP model).  Figure  11  displays  the  change  in predicted probability for a positive one standard deviation increase from the mean values;  all  of  the  variables  from  the  MNP  and  predicted  probabilities  were statistically significant at the .01% level. The  second  model  specification  tests  the  interaction  of  price  and  income shocks  in  order  to  directly  test  the  double  trigger  hypothesis.    The  income  shock variable, along with price change and the interactive variable, were included as the independent variables.  As predicted in the literature and confirmed in the baseline model, price level reductions are positively related to both short sales and REO, this relationship and  the predicted probability were both  significant  at  the  .01%  level.  Income shock was not found to be statistically significant in this model, although the directional  relationship  was  negative  between  short  sales  and  REO,  overall  an increased income shock level led to lower distressed sales. In order to test the double trigger hypothesis, the impact of income needs to be measured at  various  levels of price decreases.    Figure 11  shows  the effect of  a positive  one  standard  deviation  shift  from  the mean  and  the  resultant  change  in probabilities  for  the  variables  in  the  first  two  model  specifications.    In  the  first 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  Mean Prob +1 St Dev Prob + First Difference 
Price Change -25.5 -0.44   
SS 11.85% 16.09% 4.24% 
REO 20.38% 26.68% 6.30% 
Income Shock 30204 52016   
SS 11.85% 11.41% -0.44% 
REO 20.38% 22.33% 1.95% 
Sales Price  $553,171   $1,183,037    
SS 9.78% 3.03% -6.75% 
REO 14.47% 1.89% -12.58% 
Education 19.59 30.65   
SS 9.78% 10.34% 0.56% 
REO 14.47% 13.87% -0.61% 
Wealth  $599,163   $889,587    
SS 9.78% 10.03% 0.25% 
REO 14.47% 17.74% 3.27% 
Stability 37.47 48.94   
SS 9.78% 8.77% -1.01% 
REO 14.47% 12.50% -1.97% 
Credit Card Debt 31% 54%   
SS 9.78% 13.80% 4.02% 
REO 14.47% 23.17% 8.70% 
Owner Occupancy 59.51 83.82   
SS 9.78% 11.23% 1.45% 
REO 14.47% 16.54% 2.07% 
Asian 13.88 27.91   
SS 9.78% 9.33% -0.45% 
REO 14.47% 14.33% -0.14% 
Hispanic 40.4 69.87   
SS 9.78% 8.17% -1.61% 
REO 14.47% 14.40% -0.07% 
Black 8.4 22.71   
SS 9.78% 8.46% -1.32% 
REO 14.47% 14.99% 0.52% 
Age 34.85 41.69   
SS 9.78% 9.78% 0.00% 
REO 14.47% 15.10% 0.63% 
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probability  of  short  sale.    The maximum  income  is  an  outlier  to  the  data  set,  the value  of  230620  represent  an  income  of  $230,620  with  100%  employment,  high income probabilities will be discussed further in the section below and are depicted in  figure  14.      These  findings  lend  strong  support  to  falsifying  the  double  trigger hypothesis, as income levels have little impact on affecting a change in probability at any given price level.   
Figure 14 – High Income Level Effects on Short Sale Probability 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level (a one standard deviation downward shift).  As was the case with short sales, extreme high values of income shock do have some effect on the probability of short sale,  however,  within  normal  ranges  of  values  the  impact  is  negligible,  therefore confirming  the  strategic  default  hypothesis,  and  refuting  the  double  trigger hypothesis. 
Figure 16 ­ High Income Level Effects on REO Probability 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direction magnifies the effects.   At the mean education level of 19%, the difference between short sale and REO is 4.69%. However, when holding all other variables at their means, at education levels of greater than 60%, the probability of short sale is higher than REO.  Also of note is the direct trade off borrowers are making of short sales  for  REO;  the  percentage  of  organic  sales  is  75%  for  the  entire  range  of educational  values.    This  indicates  that  in  this  circumstance,  borrowers  make  a direct substitution of short sale for REO as the level of education increases. 
Figure 17 ­ Predicted Probability Chart for Education 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literature using sales price as a proxy for wealth.  The first difference change is twice as large for REO, as it is for short sales.   As a result, the probability of short sale is greater  at  sales  prices  higher  than  $850,000  and  at  the  first  difference  price  of  $1,183,032    (one  standard  deviation  increase)  shorts  sales  are  1.2% more  likely than REO. 
Figure 18 – Predicted Probability Chart for Sales Price 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8.7%  rise  in  the  probability.    For  credit  card  debt‐to‐income  levels  greater  than 100%,  the  probability  of  short  sale  begins  to  stabilize  around  24%,  while  it continues to increase greatly for REO, rising to a 64% probability of REO at the debt to income ratio of 150%. 
Figure 20 ­ Predicted Probability Chart for Credit Card Debt 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relationship  was  not  statistically  significant  for  the  borrowers  deciding  between REO and short sale. 
 
Figure 22 – Predicted Probability Chart for Owner Occupancy 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population was minimal,  at  .45%  for  short  sales  and  .14%  for REO.    For Hispanic population,  the  likelihood  of  short  sale  reduced  for  a  one  standard  deviation increase  by  1.61%,  while  the  impact  was  negligible  on  REO  affecting  at  .07% reduction.    The  percent  of  black  population  had  different  directional  effects, with short  sales being negatively  related, while REOs were positively  related.   The  first difference  yielded  a  1.61%  reduction  in  the  probability  of  short  sale,  and  a  .52% increase for REO.  
Conclusion    This  chapter  set  out  to  create  a  model  that  would  aid  in  explaining  the consumer  decision‐making  process  for  borrowers  facing  mortgage  default.    The extant  literature  has  two  competing  hypotheses  explaining  default—the  double trigger  hypothesis  and  strategic  default.    Proponents  of  double  trigger  hypothesis argue  that  income shocks,  in addition  to underwater mortgages are  the necessary conditions for default.   Strategic default, by contrast, argues that negative equity is the necessary and sufficient condition for default; borrowers may do so ruthlessly, or may take into account transaction costs before defaulting.  The key distinction is the borrower’s ability to pay their mortgage.  The current literature focuses entirely on  foreclosure as  the only possible outcome for a distressed borrower.   By adding short sales as another possible outcome for a distressed sale, we are better able to differentiate the conditions under which borrowers are making strategic decisions.   The  findings  from  the  multinomial  probit  models  validate  the  strategic default hypothesis, while also refuting the double trigger hypothesis.  In the baseline 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model,  employment  was  shown  to  have  a  minimal  impact  on  the  predicted probabilities  and  a  different  directional  relationship  for  short  sales  and  REO.  Income  in  both  the  baseline  and  interactive  model  had  minimal  impact  on  the probability  of  short  sale  and  a  small  impact  on  REOs.    The  fully  specified model further confirmed the findings from the baseline models; by looking at the impact of income shocks at various price  change  levels, holding all other variables  constant, the  impact  was  minimal  at  most  price  levels.    Changes  in  price  levels  affected changes  in  the  predicted  probability  at  all  levels,  as  such,  confirmed  the  strategic default hypothesis that negative equity is a sufficient condition for default. At  the maximum income shock  level, which  is an outlier  to  the data, and at high  levels  of  price  decrease  there  was  a  significant  change  in  the  predicted probability  of  short  sales  and  REO.    This  is  an  extreme  condition,  although  an important finding that at high levels of  income and price decreases short sales are more prevalent  than REO.    In  the normal range of values between plus and minus one  standard  deviation  of  income  shock  levels;  the  impact  on  the  predicted probability is less than 2% for either type of sale outcome.  This is the caveat to the double  trigger  hypothesis  rejection,  however  it  is  does  not  provide  compelling evidence to support the theory.   In  addition  to  looking  at  income  shocks  and  price  level  changes,  the  fully specified model also included other important variables identified in the literature.  The  first  of  these  “policy”  variables  was  education  level;  it  was  found  that  in neighborhoods  with  at  least  65%  of  the  population  with  a  college  degree, foreclosure is more likely than short sale.  The results were not consistent with the 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theory  in  the  literature,  as  the  predicted  relationship  was  negative  to  default.  Education  had  a  different  directional  relationship  to  the  sales  outcomes,  with  a positive  relationship  to  short  sales  and  a negative  relationship  to  foreclosure.  Put differently,  higher  levels  of  education  increases  the  probability  of  short  sale,  but reduces the probability of foreclosure.  Holding all other variables at their mean, the percentage  of  organic  sales  remained  constant  for  the  entire  range  of  education values.    This  indicates  a  direct  substitution  in  the  borrower’s  decision‐making between short sale and foreclosure, which is an important finding for policy making.  An  increase  in  education  could  be  considered  a  Pareto  improvement  as  it encourages a positive outcome while not increasing the probability of REO.   Sales price of the individual property was found to be the variable affecting the greatest first difference change for both short sales and REO.   The findings are consistent with the findings in the literature and with the theory presented earlier.  Agents  are  incentivized  to  list  high  priced  properties,  their  incentives  are  further increased  due  to  the  additional  time  and work  attributed  to  short  sales.    For  low priced properties, agents may avoid marketing their services, as they don’t value the compensation for the amount of work required.  Another way to capture this would be to research a sample of real estate agents that work in the location being studied.  Their marketing pieces or websites could be coded to see if they contain expressions such as “short sale specialists”  to capture  if real estate agents are actively pushing short sales in the area24. 
                                                        24 See http://shortsalesellit.com/ for an example of a website in Los Angeles specifically targeting short sales in their marketing 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Credit  card  debt  was  found  to  have  the  expected  positive  relationship  to default.    In areas of high credit card debt,  the probability  for  foreclosure  increases more  than  for  short  sales,  conversely  in  areas  of  low  credit  card  debt,  the  gap between REO and short sale decreases.  Credit card debt can be considered a proxy for  an  income  shortage;  therefore  the  increased  probability  of  REO  compared  to short  sale  indicates  that  income  shocks  may  have  a  less  pronounced  effect  on borrowers’ decision to select short sale.  Borrowers who are acting strategically may be  able  to  afford  their payments,  or  could possibly be  attempting  to  conceal  their behavior from lender monitoring.  Borrowers living in neighborhoods with high levels of wealth are more likely to have a  foreclosure.     The  literature predicted  that short sales would  increase at higher levels of wealth; this finding was not supported based on the findings in this chapter.  Possible reasons for the reduction in short sales could be borrowers fear of bank recourse, or the demand for borrower contributions to close the sale.   Banks require  borrowers  to  disclose  their  assets  before  approving  short  sales;  at  high levels of wealth banks could refuse to approve the short sale, or they may demand that the borrower contribute significantly to the equity short fall.  California passed new  legislation  in  2011  eliminating  the  ability  of  banks  to  require  borrower contributions in order to approve short sale25.  An area for further study would be to incorporate  data  from  2011  and  beyond  to  see  if  the  probability  of  short  sale  is impacted based on the new lender requirements. 
                                                        25 see section 580e ‐ http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi‐bin/displaycode?section=ccp&group=00001‐01000&file=577‐582.5  
  59 
Homeowner  stability  was  found  to  have  a  negative  relationship  to  the probability  of  distressed  sales.    The  net  effect  of  changing  levels  of  homeowner stability had little differentiation in the relative probabilities between short sale and REO.   These  findings do not offer any substantial evidence  to  support or discredit either  of  the  two  theories  on  default,  nor  do  they  offer  any  insight  into  creating policy to encourage additional short sales. Finally,  owner  occupancy  rates  for  neighborhoods  were  found  to  have minimal impact on differentiating a borrower’s decision on the type of default.  The findings  show  that  owner  occupancy  has  a  positive  impact  on  the  amount  of distressed sales, however the relative impact of effecting a change in probability is negligible  as  the  difference  between  the  outcomes  remains  similar  for  the  entire range of values.   The current  literature does not have a consensus as the expected effects of owner occupancy.  The findings in this study suggest that areas with more investment  properties  are  less  likely  to  have  distressed  sales.    This  could  be  the result of several factors, including that investor’s value an investment based on cash flow, therefore a short run decrease in the price would not  impact their  long‐term returns.   Additionally,  investors are more likely to use larger down payments than owner‐occupants;  therefore  investors  are  more  likely  to  have  equity  remaining despite the general decline in market prices.  Finally, investors would be less likely to purchase  real  estate as  the market experienced drastic  increases, holding  rents constant, as prices increase the returns on investment decrease.   Based on the findings in the study, several public policies could be enacted to help reduce the number of foreclosures, while also promoting short sale as a better 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alternative  for  a  borrower  in  default.    Income  shocks  were  not  shown  to  have  a major impact on strategic default, therefore loan modification programs focusing on lowering borrower payments are unlikely to reduce the number of distressed sales.  Credit  card  debt was  found  to  have  a  positive  relationship  to  default,  specifically foreclosures, if this type of debt is considered to be a proxy for income shortfalls, a program of payment deferment may be a better solution, without the moral hazard associated with loan modification for all borrowers.   In neighborhoods with high levels of education, the probability of foreclosure was less than short sales, holding all other variables at their mean value.  Educating borrowers in default to the benefits to short sale should be a main focus for lenders and  government  programs.    Currently,  the  government  offers  small  incentives  for borrowers  and  lenders  who  choose  short  sale.    Simplifying  and  streamlining  the short  sale  process  for  the  borrower,  in  addition  to  offering  larger  incentives  for borrowers, could help induce the desired behavior.   Another possible policy would be to reduce the amount of time until a borrower is able to qualify for a government backed loan after short sale.  There is currently a great deal of uncertainty as to the consequences  of  short  sale,  if  the  government  can  educate  and  incentivize borrowers, it should lead to a reduction in foreclosure.   The  results  of  an upward  shift  in  education  to 75% of  the population with college degrees and the sales price to $750,000, holding all other variables at their mean, for the range of price decreases can be seen in figure 23.  At the mean value for price drop, the probability of REO is lower than short sale for the upward shift, and  also  lower  than  the  original  mean  value  for  short  sales.    Educating  the 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population and offering incentives to real estate agents to list lower price properties could  yield  the  optimal  policy  approach  of  reducing  the  number  of  foreclosures while encourage additional short sales.  
Figure 23 – Upward shift in Education effect on Predicted Probability of REO 



















































“While  strategic  default  is  frequently  a  rational  economic  choice  for  underwater  homeowners,  if 
rationality was  the  driving  force, most  strategic  defaulters would walk  away much  sooner  than  they 
actually  do.  Instead,  most  strategic  defaulters  don’t  walk  away  until  they  are  more  than  50% 
underwater” –  White (2010) 
 
Introduction   The  previous  chapter  studied  distressed  homeowner  decision‐making, identifying  key  property  and  neighborhood  level  variables  that  influence  the borrower’s choice between foreclosure and short sale.    An additional variable that is  often  overlooked when  trying  to  identify  causal  relationships  is  the  factor  that spatial  association  can  have  on  influencing  an  individual’s  behavior.    This  can emerge in a variety of methods, but usually involves some type of contagion effect, whereby the characteristics of an individual are observed and then influence other individuals  in  neighboring  locations.    In  the  case  of  distressed  sales,  contagion manifests  itself  in  two  main  behaviors—social  stigma  and  price contamination/discount.     This chapter will focus on identifying any such social stigmas that may either encourage or discourage borrowers decision‐making. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) found that when holding morality constant, people that knew somebody who defaulted  strategically  were  82%  more  likely  to  also  use  the  put  option  and strategically  default.    Homeowners  that  are  living  in  an  area  saturated  with foreclosures and the resulting abandoned and neglected properties are likely to be 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influenced  by  the  negative  externalities.    This  chapter  will  seek  to  identify  any spatial  associations  using  a  variety  of  statistical  techniques  and measures.   What follows is a review of the literature and the resultant theories and methodology that emerge based on this area of study.   The chapter will  then present the results and findings  from  the  various  spatial  statistical  techniques  employed.    Finally,  the chapter will  conclude with  a  summary  of  the  findings  and  implications  for  future study. 
Literature Review In  a  2008  speech,  Fed  Chairman  Ben  Bernanke  noted  “high  rates  of foreclosure  can  have  substantial  spillover  effects  on  the  housing  market,  the financial  market  and  the  broader  economy”26.    Numerous  studies  have  been conducted to measure such “spillover” effects—these  effects are often referred to as contagion.  Foreclosure contagion effects studies generally fall into two categories—hedonic price models or spatial models.  The majority of studies employ some form of  hedonic  price  models27.    These  models  use  the  log  of  the  house  price  as  the dependent variable, and then neighborhood and individual house characteristics as the  independent variables.   To measure  the  contagion effect,  they will  include  the number  of  foreclosures  within  a  specific  distance  as  an  additional  independent variable.  An example of such a study would be Immergluck and Smith (2005), who look at foreclosures in Chicago during 1997 and 1998.  Their findings were that each foreclosure within an eighth of a mile of a single‐family residence reduces the value 
                                                        26 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080505a.htm 27 see Rosen, Sherwin (1974) for additional information on the methodology used in hedonic price models 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by  0.9  percent.    Chapter  3  will  focus  on  identifying  any  possible  price  contagion through the use of a hedonic price model, the remainder of this chapter will focus on spatial dependence associated with social stigma. A different approach to measuring contagion is to use spatial models rather than  hedonic  price models.    Schintler  et.  al  analyzed New England28  using  spatial temporal  data  from  January 2007  through March 2008,  the unit  of  analysis  is  the census tract level.  Foreclosure contagion is defined as an “increase in neighborhood foreclosures that spreads over time from neighborhood to adjoining neighborhood.”  This  approach  varies  greatly  from  the  hedonic  price  models;  looking  at neighborhood  trends,  rather  than  individual  price  effects  of  foreclosures  within distances of under a quarter of  a mile.   Census  tracts are  coded as hot  spots,  cold spots or  transitory.   Hot spots are areas of high  foreclosures surrounded by other tracts with high rate of foreclosure.  Cold spots, conversely, are areas with low levels of foreclosure surrounded by other tracts with low levels.  Transitory tracts can be low areas adjacent to high areas, or vice versa.   Schintler  et.  al  (2009)  used  Global  Moran’s  I  Statistic  (spatial autocorrelation) to analyze contagion between census tracts.   The spatial temporal analysis  showed  that  transitory  neighborhoods  (low  to  high  and  high  to  low) increasingly  become  like  the  hot  or  cold  spots  in  the  adjacent  tracts.    Cold  spots exhibited the most growth of any of the categories over the time period examined.  The  authors  used  rook  first  order  contiguity  to  measure  spatial  association;  the connectivity used only measure  tracts  directly  adjacent  to  the observed  tract  that                                                         28 New England is comprised of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut 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are  north,  south,  east  or  west  (similar  to  a  rook’s  movements  in  chess).    This methodology  has  some  drawbacks  as  it  does  not  necessarily  measure  all  of  the adjacent census tracts, it also does not account for varying distances.  A large census tract may have a neighbor that is several miles away from its center, while a small tract may have adjoining tracts located within a 1000m radius.  Each area of analysis needs to be carefully considered so that the appropriate spatial association is used. Can (1998) provides an overview of spatial analysis and the incorporation of GIS, noting that “GIS technology provides the optimal environment for investigating neighborhood effects in the housing and mortgage markets.”  The author suggests a two tier approach to spatial analysis;  the exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA), followed  by  the  confirmatory  data  analysis  (CDA).    In  the  ESDA,  the  goal  is  to identify  the  spatial  structure  and  distributional  patterns.    The  goal  of  CDA  is  to formally  model  the  spatial  association  and  quantify  the  strength  of  any relationships.   Spatial spillover effects can be both positive, neighbors maintaining and improving their property, or negative when abandoned properties sit vacant for long periods of time.   Another  factor  to  consider  when  studying  spatial  association  is  the  social stigma created when a home defaults on their mortgage.   Brent White summarizes over  350  personal  accounts  of  individuals  who  decided  to  strategically  default, describing  some  of  the  social  stigmas  associated  with  defaulting  on  a  mortgage.  Using  anecdotal  evidence, White  lists  anxiety,  fearfulness/uncertainty  about  ones financial future, and the unwillingness of the government to provide helpful policy solutions  as  driving  factors  for  an  individual’s  action/inaction  regarding  the 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decision  to  default.  White  poses  an  interesting  question—do  homeowners  act  as depicted in the strategic default  literature, calculating the present value associated with  owning  their  home,  and  then  decide  whether  it  is  in  their  best  interest  to exercise  the  put  option  on  their  home.    That  is  to  say  are  homeowners’  rational acting  utility  maximizers,  or  are  they  influenced  by  the  behavior  of  surrounding neighbors and acquaintances.  White found that the elderly, the highly educated, and those with high credit scores were the most likely to strategically default.   The  first  survey  conducted  regarding  individuals’  thoughts  on  strategic default was published by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009).  Using data from the Financial  Trust  Index  (FTI)29,  respondents  were  asked  about  their  views  on mortgage  default.    They  authors  argue  that  it  is  difficult  to  study  the  decision  to strategically default, “because it is de facto an unobservable event.”  There is no such data set available that indicates which mortgage defaults were strategic, and which ones were due  to an  income shock. Additionally,  they  found that when controlling for  changes  in  unemployment,  mortgage  delinquencies  are  highly  sensitive  to decreases  in  home  prices.    Therefore,  their  finding  was  that  “that  people  default because of  the size of  their negative equity, not  just because  they cannot afford  to pay”  (2009). While  some  studies  have  tried  to  combine  information  about  credit scores  with  mortgage  default  information30,  borrowers  are  incentivized  to  try  to hide  their  true  intentions  so  as  to  not  alert  the  lender  if  they  are  not  actually suffering  a  financial  hardship.    No  study  to  date  has  been  able  to  directly  survey 
                                                        29 www.financialtrustindex.com  ‐ compiled by the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University 30 See Wyman‐Experian (2009) 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individuals  who  defaulted  on  their  mortgages  to  determine  what  percentage defaulted strategically.     The  FTI  surveyed  randomly  selected  homeowners  from  around  the  country, asking if they believed strategically defaulting was immoral.   They found that 81% of all homeowners  thought  it was  immoral. However, when the same respondents were asked to answer the same question while hypothetically $100,000 underwater on their mortgage, the percentage of people who thought it was immoral dropped to 57%. Ceteris Paribus, people who have been  in  their home  for more  than 5 years were  78%  less  likely  to  default.    In  the  overall  sample,  26%  of  households  knew somebody  who  has  defaulted,  while  9%  knew  somebody  who  had  defaulted strategically.  Finally, they confirmed the findings of previous studies on foreclosure contagion, noticing a non‐linear relationship between the attitudes towards default and the number of defaults within specific ZIP codes.  That is to say, as the number of foreclosures increased in a ZIP code, the attitude towards default increased by a larger percentage, indicating that contagion could contribute towards the reduction of any social stigmas.   Fannie Mae conducts their National Housing Survey quarterly, surveying the general  population  of  homeowners  on  a  variety  of  issues, making  distinctions  for those with mortgages and for underwater borrowers.  The 3rd quarter 2011 survey specifically focuses on the issue of default and strategic default; the study provides additional  insights  on  various  demographic  groups  views  on  default.    The  survey found that owners are more  likely to consider default  if  they know somebody else that  defaults  –  6%  of  owners  who  know  a  defaulter  would  consider  default, 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Figure  24  is  a  histogram  of  the  number  of  neighbors  for  all  of  the  census tracts using queens first order connectivity.   The minimum number of neighboring tracts  is  1  (2  tracts)  and  the  maximum  is  26  (1  tract).    The  mean  number  of neighbors is 6.41; the most observed connectivity is 6 neighbors, with 554 of 2054 (27%)  tracts  falling  into  this  category.    Queen’s  first  order  is  a  more  consistent measure  than  rook’s  connectivity,  where  only  neighboring  tracts  directly  north, south,  east  and  west  are  included.    In  an  ideal  research  design  using  queen’s connectivity,  there would  be  a  consistent  number  of  neighbors  for  all  tracts.    Los Angeles  County  has  census  tracts  of  vastly  different  areas,  therefore  the  use  of  a strict distance makes more  theoretical  sense  for  this  study based on  the  idea  that contagion  occurs  at  the  neighborhood  level.    The  number  of  neighbors  isn’t consistent,  however,  distance  is more  likely  to  influence  consumer  behavior  than unobserved  geographical  census  tracts.    Certain  statistical  analyses  are  limited  to the use of queen’s connectivity; when both methods are available, the results will be compared.   Once  the  spatial  relationship  is  established,  there  are  several  different measures  that  can  be  used  to  identify  any  spatial  associations.    Morans  Global  I measures the spatial association (spatial autocorrelation) of all of the census tracts in  the system.    It  is measured on a scale  from ‐1  to 1, with 0  indicating no spatial association,  negative  values  indicate  negative  association  and  positive  numbers indicate  positive  association.  A  positive  association  indicates  that  values  that diverge  from  the  mean  (positive  or  negative)  are  clustering  near  each  other,  a negative association  indicates  that higher  than mean areas are  located near  lower 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than  mean  areas.  It  should  be  noted  that  Moran’s  Global  I  values  are  unique  to particular systems, and values cannot be compared from one study to another with a different geographic area of analysis.     As the title suggests, Moran’s Global I statistic looks at the entire system, and then  assigns  a  value,  it  does  not  distinguish  between  areas within  the  system,  as such  it does not  allow  for narrower unit of  analysis observation  for  specific  areas within the system.   Anselin (1995, 2000) developed the Local  Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA) that allow for analysis of specific tracts within the global system.  He created 4 categories of  local  relationships, High‐High,  (dark red on map) High‐Low (light red), Low‐High (light blue), and Low‐Low (dark blue).    In order  for  the spatial association to be depicted on the maps the p‐values need to be statistically significant at  the  .01% level.   The LISA statistics used  in the study use the queen’s first order connectivity as the spatial reference.   Another local measure of spatial association that will be used in this chapter is  the  Getis‐Ord‐Gi*  statistic  (Getis  and  Ord  1992).    This  method  is  similar  to Anselin’s LISA statistic in that they both identify clusters of hot and cold spots.  For the Getis‐Ord‐Gi* statistic, the spatial reference used was a fixed distance of 3000m.  Global  Moran’s  I  statistics  were  used  at  fixed  distances  of  1000m,  2000m,  and 3000m  to  determine  which  distance  had  the  highest  z  score;  3000m  was  more significant  than  the  other  distances.    Distances  of  more  than  3000m  were  not considered  for  this  study,  as  the  goal  was  to  identify  neighborhood  effects.    The results for the Getis‐Ord‐Gi* are reported in terms of their standard deviations; Hot 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Findings and Analysis   The  first  aspect  of  spatial  dependence  to  be  evaluated will  be  to  study  the emergence  and  any  possible  subsequent  contagion  of  distressed  sales.    Figure  25 shows the average percent of short sales33 in each census tract from 2008 through 2010.  It is clear that there are clusters of both high and low areas for short sales.  Of the  2054  census  tracts  in  Los  Angeles  County,  52  had  no  short  sales  during  the period of study.  The maximum percentage of short sales within a census tract was .75%, six tracts had a percentage of greater than 50%, while 610 tracts (30% of the total sample) had less than 10% of the total being short sales. 
Figure 25­ Short Sale Percentage Heat Map 2008­10  
                                                         33 Other possible sales outcomes in this study are an organic (non‐distressed) or REO (bank owned distressed sale) 












































































Short Sales - Sale Percent Change from 2007 to 2008
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Short Sales - Sale Percent Change from 2008 to 2009
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Short Sales - Sale Percent Change from 2009 to 2010
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individual  years;  the  values  for REO are higher  for  all  categories  than  short  sales, which indicates that clustering is more likely for foreclosures. 
Figure 34 – Global Moran’s I Los Angeles County Census Tracts 2008­2010 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of  spatial  dependence  is  present.    Based  on  the  OLS model  results,  five  tests  for spatial dependence were run; Lagrange Multiplier (LM) to test for spatial error,  LM for spatial lag,  Robust LM for spatial error, Robust LM for spatial error, and an LM  spatial auto‐regressive moving average (SARMA). 
Table 5 – Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence ­ Short Sales and REO 
 
Spatial Dependence Test Short Sale REO 
LM - Spatial Lag * * 
Robust LM - Spatial Lag * * 
LM - Spatial Error * * 
Robust LM- Spatial Error   ** 
LM - SARMA * * 
      
N 2054 2054 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2148 0.6253 
Log likelihood 1827 2600 
      
LM = Lagrange Multiplier  






 Error Lag Error Lag 
 Short Sale Short Sale REO REO 
LAMDA 0.2*   .1955*   
 (.035)  (.0356)  
     
Weighted Dependent  .2013*  .145* 
  (.032)  (.025) 
     
Price Change .1081* .106* -.412* -.411* 
 (.0196) (.0195) (.0286) (.0285) 
     
Income Shock -.00000071* -.00000067* .0000012* .0000012* 
 (.0000003) (.0000002) (.00000034) (.00000034) 
     
Interactive (P & I) -.00000061* -.000006* .0000028** .0000031* 
 (.000000023) (.0000008) (.000000034) (.0000012) 
     
Sales Price -.000000005* -.0000006* -.0000001* -.0000001* 
 (.000000007) (.000000007) (.000000011) (.00000011) 
     
Education -.0014* -.0013* -.0028* -.0027* 
 (.000029) (.00028) (.0004) (.0004) 
     
Credit Card Debt 0.000021 0.000018 -.00044* -.00046* 
 (.00011) (.00011) (.000016) (.00016) 
     
Net Worth -.000000004 -.000000002 -.00000001 -.00000001 
 (.000000018) (.000000018) (.00000002) (.0000002) 
     
Stability -.0015* -.0015* -.0032* -.0032* 
 (.00023) (.00023) (.00034) (.00033) 
     
Owner Occupancy .00088* .00084* .002* .002* 
 (.00014) (.00014) (.0002) (.0002) 
     
Age -.0011* -.0011* -.0032* -.0031* 
 (.000041) (.0004) (.00059) (.00059) 
     
Asian 0.00019 0.00017 0.000076 0.000065 
 (.00013) (.00013) (.00019) (.00019) 
     
Hispanic -.000068 -.000084 .001* .001* 
 (.00011) (.00011) (.00016) (.00015) 
     
Black -.00051* -.00047* .0015* .0014* 
 (.00013) (.00012) (.00018) (.00018) 
     
Constant .2549* .2255* .321* .2813* 
 (.0168) (.0317) (.0245) (.0251) 
N 2054 2054 2054 2054 
R-Squared 0.236 0.241 0.633 0.634 
Log Likelihood 2616 2621 1842 1848 
Standard errors in parentheses  *** p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *p<0.01  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Results  from  the  OLS  models  for  short  sales  and  REO  were  re‐estimated using the maximum likelihood approach while controlling for spatial error, and then spatial lags (see table 6).  For the spatial error model a LAMBA variable was added to  represent  the  spatially  correlated  errors.    In  order  to  control  for  spatial  lag,  a weighted  variable W_short_sale  or W_REO was  added  to  control  for  the  influence neighboring tracts have on observations.   The spatial  lag models were found to be better fits as they increased the R‐squared and log likelihood more than the spatial error controls.  Both of the REO models had higher r‐squared values than the short sale models, however the W_ coefficient for short sales had a larger magnitude.   In both cases the additional lag variable was positive and statistically significant at the .01% level.  
Conclusion   This chapter set out to identify any underlying spatial associations that may impact the contagion of short sales and REO.   The goal was to identify phenomena not  captured  by  demographic  or  economic  variables  that  influence  distressed homeowner  decision‐making  through  the  imposing  or  reduction  of  social  stigmas associated with  default.    Two methods  of  spatial  reference were  employed  in  the chapter—first  order  queen’s  connectivity  and  a  3000m  fixed  distance  band.  Although theoretical evidence exists to suggest that a fixed distance band is a more appropriate  measure  given  the  spatial  configuration  of  Los  Angeles  County,  the results  were  similar  for  both  spatial  references  where  they  could  be  used  to 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measure  similar  variables.    Therefore  all  of  the  findings  in  the  chapter  are  given equal weighting regardless of the spatial reference used.   The first spatial analysis conducted was the use of heat maps to display the different distribution of sales outcomes.  The number of tracts with a recorded short sale or REO  increased  for  each year of  the  study.   Both distressed  sales outcomes had an  increasing number of  tracts  that showed a negative year over year change, although REO had  a  larger  percentage  of  tracts with  a  reduction  in  percentage  of sales from the previous year.  Short sales had a range of between 30% and 38% of tracts having a decreased sales percent  from the previous year;  the same measure for  REO  had  a  range  of  between  36%  and  75%.    Given  the  increase  in  mean percentage  for distressed  sales,  this  indicates  a  consolidation of  observations  into hot and cold spots.   Global Moran’s I values were taken for the entire system for each of the years in the sample, as well as a pooled data set.  The results showed that positive spatial association  was  statistically  significant  at  the  .01%  level,  which  indicates observations are more clustered than would be randomly predicted.  The degree of global  system  spatial  association  increased  for  each  year  in  the  sample  for  short sales,  and  was  highest  in  2009  for  REO.    The  pooled  data  set  had  higher  Global Moran’s I values respectively than any individual year in the sample.     In  order  to  identify  individual  neighborhood  effects,  the  use  of  local indicators  were  used  to  measure  spatial  association.    LISA  and  the  Getis‐Ord‐Gi* measures both identified the emergence of hot and cold clusters for short sales and REO.   There were more observed hot and cold  spots  for REO  than  for  short  sales, 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although in some cases individual tracts were represented as a hot or cold spot for both distressed sales outcomes.   The final analysis conducted was to construct baseline OLS models, then test for  the  observance of  either  spatial  errors  or  lags.    The diagnostics  indicated  that both  spatial  error  and  lags  could  be  present,  although  the  robust  test  for  spatial error was not statistically significant for short sales and significant at the .05% level for REO.    These  findings  indicate  that  the  spatial  lag  is  not  statistically  significant when the error term for the dependent variable is added.  In order to confirm which type of spatial association is most likely present, the OLS models were re‐estimated using the maximum likelihood approach with specific controls for spatial error and lag.  In both distressed sales outcomes, it was found that spatial lag was a better fit, therefore the more likely spatial association for the system.   The  implications  for  all  the  spatial  diagnostics  that  were  employed  are clear—there  is  positive  spatial  association  for  both  short  sales  and  REO.    Put differently,  clusters  of  high  or  low  percentages  of  distressed  sales  form  that  are statistically different than would be randomly formed.  These clusters are observed whether  using  a  time  series  or  pooled  approach  and  either  of  the  two  spatial reference  methodologies.    These  clusters  are  unobserved  by  other  traditional statistical measures, and represent social stigma that impact the decision‐making of borrowers who are  in default on  their mortgage.   These stigmas can have either a positive or negative effect on the emergence of a particular behavior.    The  policy  implications  that  emerge  from  this  analysis  are  that  localized policies should be enacted targeting specific neighborhoods.  If positive actions can 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expected  return  on  investment  on  surrounding  properties.  Homeowners  and  investors  adjacent  to 







Introduction   The main mechanism through which distressed sales have a negative impact on  the  economy  is  through  a  price  reduction  contagion.    Results  from  the  first chapter  identified  key  variables  that  effect  distressed  borrower  decision‐making. The second chapter identified spatial associations that were not observed in the first chapter  that  also  impact  decision making  through  the  contagion  of  social  stigmas that can positively or negatively promote behavior.  Understanding the effect REOs compared  to  short  sales have on neighborhood property values provides  the  final piece  to  understanding  the  impact  distressed  sales  have  on  the  economy.    If  the price  discount  is  found  to  be  the  same  for  short  sales  compared  to  REO,  the implications for promoting short sales as a preferred outcome become less clear.  By contrast, if as predicted, short sales have less of an impact on neighborhood prices—the  findings  from  the  first  two  chapters  become  relevant  for  generating  policies aimed at the reduction of foreclosures while promoting short sales as the preferred outcome. 
  93 
  The remainder of the chapter begins with a review of the extant literature on distressed  sales  price  contagion.    The main  contribution  of  this  chapter  is  adding short sales to the analysis of the price contagion models.  The next section outlines the methodology employed to model the impact of distressed sales on neighborhood pricing.   Results of  the model are presented and then summarized to conclude the chapter. 
Literature Review   The most used methodology to capture price contagion for foreclosures is the hedonic  price  model,  where  the  dependent  variable  is  the  sales  price  and  the independent  variables  are  comprised  of  individual  property  attributes  and neighborhood  quality  measures.    An  oft‐cited  paper  by  Immergluck  and  Smith (2005) outlines  the basic methodology of  the hedonic price model  for a sample of 9,600  single‐family  properties  in Chicago  from 1997  to 1998.    In  their  study  they include concentric circles of one–eighth and a quarter mile around each foreclosure as explanatory variables, along with census tract level control variables.   For every foreclosure within one‐eighth of a mile, there was a negative price effect of .09%, the relationship  was  also  negative  for  a  quarter  mile,  however,  the  results  were  not statistically significant.  Recent  studies  have  added  to  the  hedonic  price  model  methodology, Leonard and Murdoch  (2009)  study  the effect  foreclosures have on neighborhood quality.  A foreclosure can be seen as a “nonpecuniary externality,” as it reduces the quality  of  the  neighborhood,  which  can  be  seen  as  a  local  public  good.    In  their model, they create rings of 250, 500, 1000, and 1500 feet around each foreclosure to 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measure the spatial reach of the contagion.  The list of control variables they used to measure  neighborhood  effects  were:  minority  populations,  population  over  65, owner  occupancy  rate  and  school  district.    Overall,  they  found  the  effect  of  a foreclosure within 250 feet to be  .5%, this dropped to be almost negligible at over 1000  ft.    One  difference  in  their  methodology  was  the  use  of  any  stage  of  the foreclosure process as a signal of decreased neighborhood quality—this is different than  only  looking  at  the  auction  date  or  the  sale  of  the  REO  by  the  bank  as  the observed data point.   Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009) contribute to the literature by looking at repeat sales transactions—this research design allows them to better control for the overall  changes  in  market  prices  and  to  measure  more  accurately  the  impact  of foreclosures.  By looking at all 3 stages of foreclosure—pre‐foreclosure, auction, and REO sale—this study was able  to  identify  the varying degrees of contagion during the foreclosure process.  They found contagion effects present up to one year before the  REO  sale,  but  found  the  largest  effect  on  price  to  be  at  the  REO  sale  date.    A single foreclosure has an impact of 1% decline in value for homes within 300 feet.  On average, they found that the REO sale occurred 10 months after the lender took possession of the property.   Another  example of  research design  to  capture  foreclosure price  contagion was used by Rauterkus et al (2009) in their study of the Chicago market from 2003 to  2008.    They  used  zip  code  as  the  unit  of  analysis  and  theorized  that neighborhoods  with  low  foreclosure  rates  (as  a  percentage  of  total  sales)  would have  a  greater  price  gap.    This  so  called  “REO discount” would  have  the  opposite 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effect in areas with high rate of REO sales, where the authors argue that the entire market  will  become  contaminated  and  thus  less  sensitive  to  a  price  gap  for  REO sales.    An  additional  hypothesis  advanced  was  that  a  tipping  point  would  occur where  there would be  a  reversal  of  the REO discount  once  a  saturation  level was reached.   Their results confirmed the hypothesis of a  large REO discount  for areas with  low foreclosures rates, and vice verse for areas with high rates.   The findings did not  confirm  the  theory on  the  emergence of  a  tipping point where  the  rate of change for the REO discount would reverse directions. 
 






    The descriptive statistics for the number of distressed sales are displayed in table  6  for  the  years  2007  through  2010.    Rather  than  using  the  percent  of distressed sales to capture the price contagion, the number of short sales and REO sales were used.  The theoretical reason for doing so is due to the distribution of the sample of sales; when there are low occurrences of distressed sales, the percentages can  be  skewed  and  lead  to  severely misspecified model  results.    For  example,  in 2007  the mean value  for REO sales was  .71,  the effect of 1 REO  in a  tract with 10 total  sales  compared  to  a  tract  with  100  sales  would  yield  vastly  different 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implications  if  the  percentage  of  sales  were  used.    The  problem  with  using  sale counts as opposed to sales percentage is that when the number of sales is high, the opposite problem of bias would occur as with small samples.   For  the  four  years  in  the  sample  there  were  7970  out  of  a  possible  8216 tracts that had at least one sale during the observed year, the 245 omitted variables were for tracts that had no sales.   Tracts that had 10 or  less short sales accounted for 93.5% of  the  sample,  and  tracts with 20 or  less  accounted  for 99.25%.   There were only 60 tracts that had more than 20 short sales in a given year.  For REO, 79% of the census tracts had 10 or less sales, while 93.25% had 20 or less.   There were 537  tracts  that  had more  than 20 REO  in  a  given  year.    Given  the  low number  of tracts  that  had  high  counts  for  short  sales  or  REO,  the methodology  of  using  the number of sales compared to percentage is the preferred measure. 
 
Table 6 – Descriptive Statistics for Sales Type (count) 2007­2010  
Variable N Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Short Sales -2007 1972 0.58 1.07 0 11 
REO - 2007 1972 0.72 1.11 0 9 
            
Short Sales -2008 1969 2.45 3.26 0 34 
REO - 2008 1969 7.17 8.25 0 89 
            
Short Sales - 2009 1985 4.39 5.05 0 68 
REO - 2009 1985 11.16 11.58 0 83 
            
Short Sales - 2010 2044 5.79 4.64 0 38 
REO - 2010 2044 6.98 5.26 0 37  
   Table  7  contains  the  descriptive  statistics  for  the  three  possible  sales outcomes  for a variety of sales price variables.   For both sales price and price per square foot variables,  it  is clear that there is a large difference for both short sales 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 On average the price reduction from list price to sale price was greatest for short sales and smallest for REO.  This is likely due to the vastly different objectives and  incentives of  the seller. REOs are bank owned,  therefore the goal  is  to sell  the 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Organic Sales (%) 7970 0.67 0.27 0 1 
Short Sales (%) 7970 0.11 0.11 0 1 
REO (%) 7970 0.23 0.22 0 1 
            
All Price per Sq. Ft. 7970 316 135 37 1635 
Organic Price per Sq. Ft. 7848 331 135 53 2019 
Short Sale Price per Sq. Ft. 5570 267 105 38.5 1970 
REO Price per Sq. Ft. 6302 251 99 31 1485 
            
All - Sales Price 7970 507611 410134 43800 6883914 
Organic - Sales Price 7848 540928 426857 50000 6883914 
Short Sale - Sales Price 5570 399175 247897 32000 6500000 
REO - Sales Price 6302 362244 248307 44000 9700000 
            
All - List Price 7970 548593 467401 54425 7847846 
Organic - List Price 7848 585652 490264 50000 7847846 
Short Sale - List Price 5570 447337 293893 32144 6995000 
REO - List Price 6302 381014 248074 55000 7500000 
            
Organic - List Price Discount 7848 0.06 0.06 -1.02 0.54 
Short Sale - List Price 
Discount 5570 0.08 11 -0.69 0.62 
REO - List Price Discount 6302 0.04 0.08 -0.88 0.58 
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Variable N Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
All - Days on the Market 7970 77 28 0 512 
Organic - DOM 7848 77 35 0 522 
Short Sale - DOM 5570 123 65 0 551 
REO - DOM 6302 52 37 0 1140 
            
All - Square Feet 7970 1562 524 377 6889 
Organic - Square Feet 7848 1593 554 377 6889 
Short Sale - Square Feet 5570 1516 564 377 8571 
REO - Square Feet 6302 1462 534 377 8484 
            
All - Bathrooms 7970 2.08 0.58 0 7 
Organic - Bathrooms 7848 2.11 0.61 0 7 
Short Sale - Bathrooms 5570 2.1 0.82 0 33 
REO - Bathrooms 6302 2.01 0.65 0 8 
            
All - Bedrooms 7970 2.93 0.56 0 10 
Organic - Bedrooms 7848 2.96 0.6 0 10 
Short Sale - Bedrooms 5570 2.95 0.73 0 8 
REO - Bedrooms 6302 2.85 0.67 0 6 
            
All - Lot Size 7970 42329 976230 0 4800000 
Organic - Lot Size 7848 59249 1598790 0 8920000 
Short Sale - Lot Size 5570 35534 1776642 0 132000000 
REO - Lot Size 6302 21290 852613 0 65000000 
            
All - Year Built 7968 1958 19 1889 2009 
Organic -Year Built 7846 1958 19 1889 2010 
Short Sale - Year Built 5559 1960 20 1880 2009 
REO - Year Built 6300 1957 20 1890 2008   The advantage to the use of panel data is the ability to control for unobserved heterogeneity of the various census tracts. The model is controlled for fixed effects at  the  tract  level,  and  the  standard  errors  are  clustered  at  the  tract  level.  The equation used in the study is represented by equation (1): 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yit = xitb + ai + uit     (1) 
yit = log sale price of census tracti at timet  
xit = time varying characteristics at timet 
ai = unobserved census tract effects 
uit= error term The variables used to capture the time varying characteristics are found in Table 9 of the following section. 
Findings and Analysis   Results  from the model based on equation (1) are presented  in  table 9,  the coefficients represent a percentage change rather than a unit change due to the log transformation  of  the  independent  variable.    A  hausman  test  was  conducted  to determine  if  random effects or  fixed effects were present;  the  results  rejected  the null hypothesis of random effects,  therefore  fixed effects were used to capture the unobserved effects.  For every REO within a census tract, there is an expected price discount  of  1.7%.    The REO discount  is  almost  three  times  larger  than  the  .468% discount  associated with  each  short  sale.    In  general,  the  property‐specific  details had more of an impact on sales price than did neighborhood quality controls.  The  main  driver  of  sales  price  is  the  square  footage  of  a  property;  every additional  square  foot  leads  to  a  .05%  increase  in  price.    As  would  be  expected, additional  bathrooms  have  a  positive  impact  on  pricing,  adding  6.5%  to  the  sales price for each unit.  An interesting finding was that bedrooms do not add additional value; holding square  footage constant, adding an additional bedroom reduces  the 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sales price by 6.2 percent.   Intuitively this makes sense, as buyers value the size of the rooms more than the number of rooms. The vast majority of Los Angeles County is urban; therefore lot sizes are generally small and similar across a broad range of prices.  Lot size did have a positive impact on sales price ceteris paribus, however, it was  not  statistically  significant.    Similarly,  the  year  built  for  the  sales  in  a  census tract was not  statistically  significant,  it  also did not have any  substantial  effect on the sales price in the census tract. 
Table 9 –Hedonic Price Mode Results –Los Angels County Sales 2007­10 
 Log Sales Price 
Sq. Ft. Total .000595* 
 (.000035) 
  
Short Sale (#) -0.0047* 
 (.0011) 
  









Lot Size 0.000000003 
 (.000000002) 
  

















N observations 7968 
R-Squared 0.56 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *p<0.01 
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 This dissertation focuses on mortgage defaults in Southern California during the  housing  bubble  of  the  2000s.  The  rapid  decline  in  the  housing  market  that precipitated  the  current  recession  has  been  accompanied  by  an  unprecedented number of loan defaults and foreclosures.  Recent studies have identified two major theories of default—the “double trigger” hypothesis, where negative equity and an income  shock  are  necessary  conditions  for  default—and  “strategic  default” where negative equity is a sufficient condition for default.  The literature on default focuses exclusively  on  foreclosure  and  the  outcome  of  mortgage  default—it  therefore follows that all the implications and policy advice is solely focused on foreclosure. The area of focus for this study was Los Angeles County, where every closed sale from 2007 to 2010 was coded into three possible sales outcomes: 1) Organic 2) Short Sale 3) Real Estate Owned (REO).    In doing so, another possible outcome for default—short  sale—was  added  to  the  analysis.    Short  sales  represent  14% of  all sales  in  the  sample,  compared  to  28%  for  REOs;  omitting  short  sales  as  another outcome eliminates a significant portion of all distressed sales from the analysis of mortgage default.  Chapter 2 created a multinomial probit model to understand the important  variables  for  borrowers who  default  on  their mortgage;  the  dependent variable is sales outcome, based on the three categories outlined above. The  findings  from  the  multinomial  probit  models  validate  the  strategic default hypothesis, while also refuting the double trigger hypothesis.  In the baseline 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model,  employment  was  shown  to  have  a  minimal  impact  on  the  predicted probabilities  and  a  different  directional  relationship  for  short  sales  and  REO.  Income  in  both  the  baseline  and  interactive  models  had  minimal  impact  on  the probability  of  short  sale  and  a  small  impact  on  REOs.    The  fully  specified model further confirmed the findings from the baseline models; by looking at the impact of income shocks at various price  change  levels, holding all other variables  constant, the  impact was minimal at all but extremely high‐income  levels.   Changes  in price levels  affected  changes  in  the  predicted  probability  at  all  levels,  therefore confirming  the  strategic  default  hypothesis  that  negative  equity  is  a  sufficient condition for default. In  addition  to  looking  at  income  shocks  and  price  level  changes,  the  fully specified model also included other important variables identified in the literature.  The  first  of  these  “policy”  variables  was  education  level;  it  was  found  that  in neighborhoods with at least 65% of the population with a college degree, short sale is more likely than foreclosure.   The results were not consistent with the theory in the literature, as the predicted relationship was negative to default.  Education had a different directional relationship to the sales outcomes, with a positive relationship to short sales and a negative relationship to foreclosure. Holding all other variables at  their  mean,  the  percentage  of  organic  sales  remained  constant  for  the  entire range  of  education  values.    This  indicates  a  direct  substitution  in  the  borrower’s decision‐making between short sale and foreclosure, which is an important finding for policy making. 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Sale price of  the  individual property was  found  to be  the variable affecting the greatest first difference change for both short sales and REO.   The findings are consistent with the findings in the literature and with the theory presented earlier.  Real Estate agents are incentivized to list high priced properties, their incentives are further increased due to the additional time and work attributed to short sales. Chapter  3  focused  on  identifying  any  spatial  association  present  for  short sales and REO,  these effects are unobserved by  traditional  statistical measures,  so add to the literature on mortgage default.  Contagion of distressed sales can emerge via social constraints that effect borrower behavior.  These social stigmas can either promote  or  discourage  either  type  out  distressed  sale  outcome.  Two methods  of spatial  reference were  employed  in  the  chapter—first  order  queen’s  connectivity and a 3000m fixed distance band.   Although  theoretical evidence exists  to suggest that  a  fixed  distance  band  is  a  more  appropriate  measure  given  the  spatial configuration  of  Los  Angeles  County,  the  results  were  similar  for  both  spatial references when they could be used to measure similar variables. Global Moran’s I values were taken for the entire system for each of the years in the sample, as well as a pooled data set.  The results showed that positive spatial association  was  statistically  significant  at  the  .01%  level,  which  indicates observations are more clustered than would be randomly predicted.  The degree of global  system  spatial  association  increased  for  each  year  in  the  sample  for  short sales,  and  was  highest  in  2009  for  REO.    The  pooled  data  set  had  higher  Global Moran’s  I  values  respectively  than  any  individual  year  in  the  sample.  The 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strengthening  of  the  spatial  association  indicates  that  contagion  is  occurring  for both distressed sales outcomes. The  final  research  chapter  concludes  with  a  study  of  the  price  discount associated  with  distressed  sales.    The  literature  previously  only  investigated  the impact of REO, by adding short sales to the analysis, a determination of their relative impacts can be made. Results from the hedonic price model showed that short sales had almost three times  less of a price discount compared to REO.   Each additional short  sale  has  an  average  a  .47%  reduction  on  sales  in  the  same  census  tract,  for REO  the  impact  is 1.7%.   This  is  a  crucial  finding  that  ties  together  the other  two empirical  chapters.    It  can  be  demonstrated  that  short  sales  have  less  of  a detrimental  impact on neighborhood pricing.   The results of chapter 2 and 3 focus on  differentiating  consumer  decision‐making  regarding  distressed  sales  and  also identify the underlying spatial associations; which are important findings given the lessened price reduction associated with short sales. Understanding  the  neighborhood  variables  that  promote  short  sales  or reduce the likelihood of foreclosure allow for the creation of policy to encourage the preferred  outcome  of  short  sales.    The  spatial  associations  identified  allow  for localized  targeted policy‐making  to help encourage social  stigmas  that will  reduce foreclosure and/or promote short sales.   An example of the economic impact that promoting short sales compared to foreclosure becomes clear when a comparison of  the mean values  is  forecast  for a reduction  in  foreclosures. The mean number of REO sales  for each census  tract  in Los Angeles County  for 2009 was 11.   There were a  total of 65,003 sales  in 2009, 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